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To what extent did the gains from the colonial slavery trade benefit early industrialisation in 
Britain? In the early modern period (or in the period of between late 17th and 18th centuries) the 
slave trade was the linchpin of Britain’s Atlantic trade and there is an ongoing debate over 
whether the colonial slave trade played a significant exogenous role in Britain’s early 
Industrialisation, or indeed whether it played any role at all. As early as 1944, Eric Williams made 
several important and controversial claims connecting colonial slavery to Britain’s early 
industrialisation in Capitalism and Slavery.1 Amongst his other claims, his argument that the profits 
obtained in the African slave trade provided one of the main channels of English capital 
accumulation which financed the industrial revolution has continued to inspire many subsequent 
researchers and has also been the subject of criticism.2  His critics have questioned this view 
from mainly two points: That the profits of slave trade were not quantitatively large enough to 
have an impact on Britain’s macro economy and that the need for large fixed capital investment 
was limited for the embryonic industries of eighteenth century Britain.3 
 
More recently, there is a growing body of scholarship in economic history emphasising the 
positive link between capital and wealth accumulation from slavery and slave economy and its 
role in financing economic growth in Britain. Whether referring to Williams’ position implicitly 
or explicitly, this recent literature is informed by the new knowledge made available since the 
time of Williams and his critics; that it was working (circulating) capital rather than fixed capital 
that mattered most to early businessmen in Britain,4 and that slavery and the slave economy was 
 
1  Williams (1944). For recent assessment of William’s theses on slave trade and slavery and its connection with 
Britain’s industrialisation, see Inikori (2002), pp.1-18, Morgan (2000), Hall et al (2014). For the ongoing debates over 
the claims made by William in the North American context, see Olmstead and Rhodes (2018) and Wright (2019).  
2 Williams wrote: ‘… the profits obtained [in African slave trade] provided one of the main streams of that 
accumulation of capital in England which financed the industrial revolution.’ Williams (1944), p.52. 
3 On the debate over the Williams thesis, see Inikori (2002) and Hall et al (2014). 
4 Hudson (1990) 
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part of much wider nexus of geographies and organisations than Williams conceived. The 
methodology that much of the research in these literatures has taken is based on well 
documented case studies using a broader concept of slave economy. There is an abundance of 
case studies illustrating regional and sectoral wealth transfers from the slave economy into new 
industries and institutions in industrialising Britain that transformed the scale of production, 
shipping, insurance, marketing as well as port-city development in Britain.5 
 
Banking in 18th-19th century Britain is the field on which this paper focuses to argue for a 
formative impact of the slave-based economy. As wealthy members of society, it was often the 
case that founders of early banks originating from the mercantile community engaged in the 
slave trade or the colonial trade especially in London and port cities like Bristol and Liverpool in 
the 18th century. Thanks to the latest research by the Legacy of the British Slavery (‘LBS’) group, 
numerous examples of wealth accumulation from the slave trade invested into banking in both 
London City and beyond are being discovered and it is now known that this connection of 
banking with slavery-based wealth was evident not only in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries but also into the early nineteenth century.6 
 
The importance of slavery and the slave economy has also been linked to the development of 
domestic credit markets in the 18th century. Due to the long distances involved, shipment and 
remittance collection took a long time to reach merchants in British ports, and as a result credit 
was crucially important to British merchants involved in the trade. How a small number of 
reputable acceptance houses established dominance in financing the West India bills, the bills 
drawn on London that financed the West India trade, is an important aspect of London’s 
emergence as the centre of credit markets.7 Moreover, the demand for financing of the bills of 
exchange in the provincial regions engaged in supplying goods to the West India markets and 
more generally in the growing Atlantic markets may have promoted the integration of provincial 




5 Zahedieh (2010), Hall et al (2014) 
6 Legacies of British Slave-ownership project (https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/)  
Draper has shown how former slave owners abandoned their engagement with the sugar economy and moved their 
investment elsewhere after the Emancipation using the compensation money to move into a variety of other 
enterprises from railway construction to maritime insurance and banking. Draper (2009), Hall et al (2014). 
7 Sheridan (1958) 
8 Hudson (2014) 
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Despite the growing evidence linking both the credit demands of the West Indies trade and the 
wealth generated by the trade to the British financial sector, the empirical analysis as to the 
degree in which the West India finance played a role in the development or evolution of 
banking business and practice in Britain is still only developing.9 This is largely due to the 
paucity and technical difficulties in dealing with data on 18th century banks. Empirical case 
studies are currently fragmentary which has prevented the formation of a general judgement on 
how the West India trade played a role in the development of London banking or more broadly 
in British banking. This paper aims to fill the gap by offering evidence on a particular and 
important financial institution in British banking, the Bank of England. 
 
This paper finds evidence of the importance of the West Indies trade to the development of 
British banking in an unexpected source, in the Court of Director’s meeting minutes of the 
Bank of England, particularly concerning the private sector. These records demonstrate that 
the Bank was sufficiently concerned about the effects of West India merchant bankruptcies on 
the banking system through the financial crises of 1790s, that it had developed a series of 
lending procedures in order to support the West India merchants. Once these lending 
techniques were established in aid of the West India merchants, they were applied to last resort 
lending during the crises of 1810, 1816 and 1825. The paper’s main claim is that the techniques 
that the Bank would use as a lender-of-last-resort – one of the cornerstones of the British 
financial system that supported industrialization – were initially developed to support the 
merchants who financed the slave trade. This paper focuses attention on the City bankers, who 
provided financial services to the commercial mercantile community.  This was the form of 
banking that was actively supported throughout this period by the discount facilities of the 
Bank of England, which was arguably already acting as a lender of last resort through the latter 
years of the eighteenth century.10 Over the period of our study there was significant evolution 
in the commercial banking system. As Clapham observes, in the middle years of the 
18th century the Bank of England discounted a substantial volume of bills of exchange for 
manufacturers and traders, but by the early decades of the 19th century the Bank was already a 
bankers’ bank, discounting mostly for merchant bankers and financial professionals.11 
 
9 Ishizu (2013) 
10 Lovell (1957), James (2012), Kosmetatos (2018).  
11 Clapham (1945): One explanation for this transformation is that business increased so dramatically after the 
Restriction in 1797, that the Out-Tellers, who collected on bills that were due, were carrying significant quantities of 
cash. In order to protect these Bank employees from the hazards of traipsing throughout London with bags of cash, 
the Bank adopted a policy in 1805 that in order to be discountable, a bill must be accepted payable at a banker. C.D. 
Feb 7  
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The primary sources for the loans discussed in this paper are the volumes of meeting minutes 
kept by the Bank of England’s Court of Directors spanning the dates from December 1787 to 
April 1823. The minutes document the business transacted by the Directors at their weekly 
meetings, as well as any special meetings that were called. The entries in the meeting minutes are 
particularly detailed from the time of the Suspension of Cash Payments in 1797.12 The minutes 
are contemporaneously indexed, and the principal index entry relied on for this paper is labelled 
‘Loans.’ Relying on the indices to the minutes means that loans may be omitted from our data 
because of an error on the part of the clerk who created the index.13 However, because such 
errors are apparently rare, the minutes allow us to have a fairly comprehensive view up until 
February 1811 of the private sector lending of the Bank that did not take place through the 
discount window, or in other words of extraordinary private lending. In February 1811 a formal 
policy for such lending outside the discount window was adopted.14 This rich source has been 
studied by previous scholars such as John Clapham and Frank Fetter in their studies of the Bank 
of England, but the scale of the loans made to the West India merchants by the Bank largely 
escaped their notice. Indeed, it is only possible now to identify the Bank’s borrowers as West 
India merchants because of the existence of the Legacies of British Slave Ownership searchable 
database and other powerful search engines. 
 
Before detailing the Bank’s loans to West India merchants, it is important to observe that as a 
percentage of the Bank’s loans to private individuals, these loans are for the most part negligible. 
Over the relevant period the average sum outstanding in the form of discounts ranges from £5 
million in 1797 to more than £21 million in 1810. As a result, the only lending studied in this 
paper that was on a scale that can be measured against the Bank’s discount business was the 
initial nine-month loan organized in 1799 by the West India merchants’ committee of £1.5 
million. This loan (or more accurately series of loans) was apparently included in the discounts 
outstanding and accounted for a little over 20% of the discounts at the time. Even though the 
lending studied here is not quantitatively important, we can trace a steady evolution of the Bank’s 
lending policy that culminated in formal procedures for emergency lending. Thus, the qualitative 
implications of this lending for the Bank’s ability to act as a lender of last resort are very 
significant.  
 
12 The minutes from 1797 include copies of letters presented at the meetings, reports from committees created to 
study and resolve issues, and sometimes competing resolution proposals that provide evidence of debates that took 
place at the meetings. 
13 Two such omissions are noted in the footnotes to Table 1. 
14 Future work will expand this investigation to include the minutes of the Committee of Treasury, which 
particularly after 1811 likely includes further details on the Bank’s lending to the private sector.  
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Section 1 of the paper discusses the structure of the West India trade, the demand for credit to 
support it, and the finance of West India bills. Section 2 discusses the Bank of England’s role in 
the crises of 1793 and 1799. Section 3 explores the extraordinary loans that were extended to 
West India merchants after the 1799 crisis. Section 4 details how this experience shaped formal 
procedures that were adopted in February 1811 for emergency lending beyond the standard 
discount policy. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
1. Financing the West India Trade: Bills of Exchange and Commission Houses 
in London 
British colonial plantations were first established on the Caribbean islands in the mid 
seventeenth century and continued to grow until the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. The 
Caribbean sugar economy was large. Contemporary planters reckoned that the value of the 
British Caribbean islands amounted to as much as 70 million pounds in 1789 and annual profits 
from the sugar plantation cultivation up to 1.7 million pounds in 1770.15 In the original form of 
the Atlantic triangle trade which lasted through the mid-eighteenth century, slave merchants 
would head to West Africa where they purchased slaves from local traders in exchange for beads, 
cotton clothes and cowry shells and, later, British manufactured goods.16 They would then rely 
on slave factors in the West Indies to sell the slaves to planters, receiving payment in colonial 
produce such as sugar, together with some specie and bills of exchange. Finally, the cargo of 
colonial produce and the combined payment media would be shipped home. This was the 
original form of the triangle trade.  
 
As consumer demand for sugar and other colonial produce grew in the mid eighteenth century, 
distinct designs for ships were invented specifically for transporting slaves to the West Indies 
and for transporting sugar to Britain. By then the original triangle trade had transformed itself 
into the slave trade that operated between Britain, West Africa and the West Indies, and the 
sugar trade that ran between Britain and the West Indies. Under the new system, a slave ship 
would disembark slaves in the West Indies into the hands of a slave factor and return to Britain 
carrying bills of exchange as payment for slaves. That is, bills of exchange replaced sugar as the 
 
15 Morgan (2000). 
16 Most slave merchants stayed in Britain as their chief business concern was the management of the voyage 
although some merchants occasionally travelled on voyages. They did not usually own the ships that carried their 
cargo. Instead they spread the risks of shipping by owning ships in partnerships so each merchant would not lose 
his entire investment when a ship capsized.  
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principal means of payment in this trade. To settle the debts between the parties between Britain 
and the West Indies, a small number of reputable merchants’ houses came to specialise in the 
Wet India trade and established dominance in this trade by accepting final responsibility for 
these bills that were presented in Britain for the sale of slave in the colony.17 These houses were 
commission houses and known as the West Indies merchants in London as well as in provincial 
port cities such as Liverpool. Some were forerunners of the specialised merchants’ banks of the 
nineteenth century.18 
 
The commission houses financed two types of bills of exchange that were typically required to 
settle the sale of a slave in the West Indies trade, one drawn by a factor and the other issued by a 
planter.19 The first type of bills were drawn by a slave factor on a commission house in London 
to pay the slave merchant. Although factors were only intermediaries between slave merchants 
and planers, they were fully liable on the bills they drew. Many slave merchants preferred bills 
drawn by slave factors who were in partnership with a London commission house agent over the 
bills drawn by the planters, because the factors’ bills were both secure and shorter-term, paying 
out more quickly than a planter’s bill.20 The commission house in London would accept the bill 
by endorsing it, and, as the acceptor, would pay the stated amount of money to the payee or 
bearer of the bill on maturity. The agent charged a commission in exchange for bearing the risk 
related to the bill. The second type of bills were issued by the planter and ultimately served to 
clear the debt of the first type of bill. The commission agents were engaged by sugar plantation 
owners to manage the shipping and sale of their sugar in the British market according to the 
terms of a commission agreement.21 In this way, the commission houses combined the 
commission business and wholesale sugar merchant business. The receipts from the sale of the 
sugar were credited to the planter’s account with the commission house, and the planter was able 
to draw a bill of exchange against this account. Such a bill functioned as an instruction directing 
the commission houses to clear the debt of the first bill using the receipts from the sale of the 
sugar on the planter’s behalf.  
 
17 Sheridan (1958), pp.256-60.; Checkland (1957-8, 1958). 
18 Chapman (1992). 
19 On transactions using bills of exchange between Britain and the Caribbean colonies, see Sheridan (1958), Price 
(1980), Morgan (2005), and Nagasawa (2012). 
20 Sheridan (1958), p.261. Presumably this was possible in part because of the factors’ liability on the bills and the 
fact that they bore some portion of the risks of maturity transformation that were taking place in the trade. 
21 The commission agreement would specify the various expenses (cargo charter fees, warehouse fees, customs, 
insurance fees etc) and commission charges (0.5 % for bill acceptance fees, and 2.5 % for sugar sales agent fees) that 
would be deducted from the receipts generated by the sale of the sugar. The agent also offered various services to 
the planters: the provision and shipment of tools, daily items, and luxury items for the plantation, recruiting and 
training of the white clerks to work on the plantation, etc. Sheridan (1958), p.262. 
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Both types of bills were separately issued and sent to the commission houses in London and 
settled by them. In return, the commission houses received commission from the acceptance of 
bills drawn to pay for the purchase of slaves as well as from the handling of the plantation sugar 
in Britain. These commission houses, who were called West Indies merchants, were able to 
satisfy both the colonial planters who needed relatively longer-term credit when purchasing 
slaves in the West Indies22 and slave merchants who sought payment for the slaves that was both 
reliable and quick. Using these two types of instruments, all the transactions in the Caribbean 
sugar/slave trade could be settled using bills of exchange. 
 
These bills arising from the West India trade (West India bills) may have played an important 
role in expanding the types of assets available as investments for the financiers and investors in 
the City in the eighteenth century. From the early eighteenth century, the conventional outlets of 
financial investment in the London financial market were comprised of long-term loans: public 
debt and loans to select chartered companies, such as the East India Company, the South Sea 
Company, and the Hudson Bay Company, and to some public utilities.  Thus, while a market in 
short-term domestic and foreign bills operated throughout the eighteenth century, through the 
first half of the century its importance as a financial outlet was limited. In the second half of the 
century the West India trade, largely financed by bills that provided circulating capital for the 
purchase of slaves, grew to make up a significant part of the commercial paper circulating in the 
London money market.23 According to Pressnell, up until the expansion of domestic trade in the 
1780s, inland bills that originated in domestic trade were scarce in the provincial areas. As a 
result, many country bankers, emerging in this era in great numbers across the country, were 
investing in bills that originated in overseas trade. Indeed, even after the circulation of inland 
bills increased, West India bills continued to be regarded by bankers as good investments, and 
would be so regarded well into the 19th century.24 
 
The challenge for the newly emerging country bankers was to find investments that were 
appropriate given the short-term of the banks’ liabilities, which took the form of both bank 
notes and agreed credit lines extended to account holders. Bills of exchange and other forms of 
commercial paper were popular investments for bankers due to their liquidity. Bills were 
negotiable instruments and therefore usually liquid or semi-liquid assets. The bills that were most 
 
22 The duration of the West India bills were usually between 3 months to 36 months. Planters could not realise 
profit until sugar was sold in Europe. 
23 Checkland (1958), p.461. 
24 Pressnell (1956), pp.435-6. 
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liquid and could circulate as easily as bank notes were those that were discountable at the Bank 
of England. In practice this meant that the liquid bills had two months or less to run. Longer 
bills were negotiable and thus semi- liquid but could not circulate with the same ease. And the 
longest bills, such as West India bills of 24 or 36 months were relatively illiquid.  
 
Even the 36-month bills were, however, supported by the fact that the London money market 
was a discount market. This meant that these bills could only be circulated by endorsement. That 
is, when the bill was negotiated, it was not a “true sale” for accounting purposes. Instead the 
discounter continued to be liable to pay the full value of the bill until it was finally paid – in the 
vast majority of cases by either the issuer or the acceptor, and not by the discounter. That is, 
everyone who negotiated a bill retained secondary, but not primary, liability on the bill. This 
discount market structure was extraordinarily effective at increasing the liquidity of commercial 
paper. This liquidity was, however, generated at the expense of creating a vast network of firms 
that were exposed whenever there was a bankruptcy.  
 
Ideally, the bills that comprised most of a bank’s asset portfolio would be trade bills of six 
months or less, since once a bill had two months or less to run it could typically be transferred to 
a bank’s correspondent in London and discounted at the Bank of England. In practice, however, 
especially prior to the expansion of domestic trade in the 1780s, banks were proliferating faster 
than the safest investment opportunities, and bank often carried some liquidity risk in their 
portfolios. In this environment, West India bills, even though they were relatively risky 
investments because of their term, were also popular investments for banks. 
 
Much of the debt owed by the West India planters to the West India merchants and slave factors 
was for the purchase of new capital in the form of slaves, their largest annual expense, and was 
for a term of 4 to 6 months or longer. Furthermore, when the sugar trade was flourishing, the 
merchants allowed the planters to go in even greater debt, sometimes as long as 12 to 36 
months. However, when sugar prices fell at the end of the eighteenth century and in the early 
nineteenth century, the merchants demanded the money back to invest in other, more profitable 
opportunities. Planters were forced to give mortgages on their plantations and eventually the 
merchants effectively became absentee plantation owners. Many slave factors who had advanced 
credit to planters in earlier years were now reluctant to do so, and even the established system of 
drawing bills of exchange on absentee owners’ accounts guaranteed by sugar shipments to 
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England was increasingly becoming difficult. Long dated West India bills in this situation were 
considered a risky segment of a bank’s asset portfolio. 
 
 
2. The Bank of England and the crises of 1793 and 1799 
West Indian paper, due both to its term and the fact that it was held by country banks, was one 
of the most volatile elements in the financial markets, and this may well have contributed to 
expose the weakness of the English financial system in the financial crises that happened in 1793 
and 1799. 
 
The financial crisis of 1793 was described by Clapham as “the worst financial and commercial 
crisis that [the country] had yet known.”25 While contemporary critics often claimed that the 
crisis was caused by reckless country banks that failed or stopped payment during the crisis due 
to insufficient capital reserves, the cause of the crisis may well have been the overseas trade, 
particularly the West India and cotton trades, not the country banks. After the recovery had 
begun from the American Civil Wars in the late 1780s, the West India trade was enjoying a 
prosperous period with rising sugar prices through the early years of the 1790s. London West 
India merchants provided credit on a large scale and the volumes of West India bills and 
planters’ bills held in England were increasing. The outbreak of the war against France came as a 
shock to Britain’s overseas trade and the illiquidity in the financial market arose from bills that 
originated in overseas markets, especially the West India trade.  
 
James Baillie and Co., a West India firm in London, fell into difficulty holding bills of nearly half 
a million pounds. This led to the collapse of the Liverpool bank, Charles Caldwell & Co. which 
was heavily involved in the finance of the West India trade, and the failure of Gregson & Co’s 
bank followed. The failures in 1793 of several firms that had issued long bills had a contagion 
effect. Those holding the bills of West India or American merchants that had not failed could no 
longer circulate these bills on any terms. This freeze in the credit markets risked generating a new 
onslaught of failures. One of the first was Lane, Fraser & Son, a West India trading company, 
which collapsed when the Bank of England declined their bills for discounting. This was 
followed by failures of other West India merchants and bankers, Burton, Forbes & Gregory, and 
Caldwell & Co of Liverpool. In this crisis, many of the London West India merchants went into 
 
25 Clapham (1945), p. 259. 
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difficulties, ‘they being all linked together in the bill way from £3 to 400,000 in circulation’.26 
Noting the geographical concentrations of bank failures during the crisis in Bristol and the 
surrounding west counties and in the Lancashire cotton trade region, Pressnell argued that the 
popularity of investments in West India bills and cotton bills arising from North America 
explains why bankruptcies were concentrated in the regions that were connected to these trades. 
In fact, in March 1793 West India bills accounted for 34% of the bills of bankrupt merchant 
firms, measured by value. American bills, including the cotton trade, accounted for another 
substantial portion of the defaulted bills.27 
 
The financial crisis of 1793 was a major shock to the West India merchants in Liverpool as well 
as in London. When the merchants and bankers who were exposed to this problem sought help 
from the Bank of England, they were not turned away, but they were told that the only bills the 
Bank could discount for them were those with two months or less to run. For many this was no 
help at all. The chamber of commerce of Liverpool launched a joint petition to lobby for a 
parliamentary Act to support the mercantile community. This action was successful in 
convincing the government and the Bank of England to come up with a plan whereby the long 
bills could be exchanged for Exchequer Bills.28 Because Exchequer Bills could be discounted at 
the Bank, this policy had the effect of supporting liquidity on the money market. In the event, 
less than half of the Exchequer Bills that had been authorized for this purpose were issued. In a 
classic denouement of a panic, as soon as abundant liquidity was made available, it was no longer 
needed.29 
 
Six years later in 1799, the West India trade was again hit by a commercial crisis. Prior to the 
liquidity crisis in October, the credit supply to the West India merchants was buoyant due to 
heavy speculation in the Hamburg market.30 But the enactment of the Slave Act in August 
which put in place permanent regulations concerning slave ships and docks had the effect of 
dampening public confidence.31 While the problems cited by the West India merchants’ 
committee refer to a lack of demand for their product, it seems more likely that unusual supply 
 
26 Pares (1950), p.357. 
27 Pressnell (1956), p.458, Checkland (1958). 
28 Bennett (2013). 
29 When the Government again issues such “commercial Exchequer Bills” in 1811, once again the West India 
merchants are implicated. Pressnell (1956), p. 468. 
30 Ragatz (1928). 
31 This law, 39 Geo. III c. 80, made permanent regulations governing slave ships, such as the requirement that decks 




was being driven by the forced selling of merchants who could not obtain the financing needed 
to store the goods they had brought to Europe. After all, public knowledge that the legislation 
had weakened them financially could easily mean that it had become hard to find creditors who 
were willing to be exposed to them. This led to a sudden liquidity crisis in October and this 
time the Directors of the Bank of England voted to support the West India merchants with 
extraordinary loans which just six years earlier had been deemed impossible. The Court of 
Directors’ minutes show that West India merchants received substantial advances: the 
aggregate loan to the West India merchants was £1.5 million for 6 months, and was then 
extended for another 3 months. The Bank’s intervention was effective, as just a month after the 
details of the Bank’s support were worked through, the price of coffee had increased by 33%32: 
in the absence of the Bank’s support, many West India merchants would probably have had to 
dump their merchandise on the market. Apparently the loan was paid up by July 1 1800, 
because we hear no more about it. 
 
The move by the Bank’s directors in 1799 to support the West India merchants marked a 
significant deviation from the Bank’s lending policy. Prior to 1799, the Bank’s lending to 
private individuals outside regular discount window lending was extremely limited, aside from 
two categories of clients: the state and chartered companies.33 The Bank regularly supported 
issues of government debt by providing short term loans to the buyers, who could thus pay in 
instalments over the course of a few months. The Bank also had a handful of regular clients for 
term loans, such as the East India Company, the South Sea Company, and the Hudson Bay 
Company. But in 1799, the Bank had to act averting a crisis driven by the by the illiquidity of 
the West India firms that could easily have led to bankruptcies and set off a broader 
commercial crisis.   
 
There were several circumstances that are likely to have played a role in this decision. The Bank 
could be sure from the experience of the 1793 crisis that insisting on following its regular 
lending rules would fail to provide the necessary assistance. In addition, presumably there were 
reasons why it was impossible for the government to step in as it had in 1793, whether due to 
the politics of issuing more debt, to the politics of rescuing an industry it had just destabilized 
by regulation, or to a need to focus on the war effort. Or perhaps the Bank’s Court of 
Directors simply recognized that under the circumstances of the suspension the distinction 
 
32 As is indicated by comparing the prices quoted in C.D. Nov 7 1799 and C.D. Dec 19 1799 
33 An exception that proves the rule was a £6,000 loan to the Lord Mayor of London in 1793 because of the 
‘mischief’ his bankruptcy could produce in a panic. Clapham (1945). I, p.261. 
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between a loan intermediated by government and a direct Bank loan was really just a matter of 
form and insisting upon maintaining it would create unnecessary complications. 
 
Factors that would have pushed the Bank to avert such a crisis include: the knowledge from 
the 1793 experience that failures of West India merchants would have a broader effect on the 
banking system as a whole; the experience of the 1796 tight money policy that caused a bad 
recession and ended in the suspension, leading several directors to conclude that it was the 
Bank’s duty to support all good commercial bills and to be fearful of the consequences of 
setting off another crisis (H.C. 1810); and the knowledge that in these early years of the 
suspension the Bank was in a very delicate position, and that it was essential to keep the 
merchants who were supporting the Bank by circulating its paper from panicking. 
 
 
3. Extraordinary Lending by The Bank of England 
The extraordinary lending to the West India merchants by the Bank of England in 1799 not 
only meant that the Bank widened its lending to private individuals, but also signified the 
development of new lending tools by the Bank. Firstly, the lending to the West India 
merchants in 1799 reflected the growing acceptability of accommodation paper. The 
significance of this fact can be understood by considering the nature of accommodation paper. 
In legal terms, a ‘real bill’ was a bill that originated in a genuine commercial transaction. In the 
early phase of circulation of bills of exchange, it was considered that the initial transaction 
made a bill negotiable and, if challenged, the holder of the bill who was seeking payment could 
be required to prove the original transaction. By contrast, an accommodation bill was a bill 
that was created as a simple loan or IOU. However, by 1791 a series of court decisions had 
transformed accommodation bills into negotiable instruments, by granting the holder of such 
a bill the right to payment if he could prove that he, not the original payee, had received the 
bill in a genuine commercial transaction. Within a decade, accommodation bills were already 
common, and in some cases were easily identifiable as accommodation bills.34 
 
The growth of accommodation paper was facilitated by changes to the Bank of England’s 
policy of discounting promissory notes. Bills and promissory notes differed in the number of 
signatories. Bills of exchange were drawn on a third party, comparable in modern terminology to a 
bank, and bore two promises to pay (signatories), that of the issuer and of the drawee (i.e. the 
 
34 Rogers (1995). 
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bank) who had accepted and signed the bill, in addition to that of the discounter. A promissory 
notes, by contrast, was not drawn on ‘a bank’ and thus had only one promise to pay in addition 
to that of the discounter. This made bills safer investments than promissory notes and more 
“real” instruments as being supervised by a third-party acceptor (i.e. a bank). When the Bank of 
England’s policy of discounting promissory notes was established in 1723, it required that each 
note be read to the Court of Directors, before being approved for discount (C.D. Nov 7 1723). 
That is, when promissory notes were first discounted, they were not viewed as part of the 
ordinary course of business that was handled by the Governor, Deputy Governor, and 
Committee in Waiting, but as a special accommodation on the part of the Bank. 
 
In 1764, the discount of promissory notes became part of the ordinary business of the Bank 
when a new policy was put in place whereby the Committee in Waiting together with the 
Governor or Deputy Governor reviewed all the notes submitted and divided them into three 
groups: i. some notes were disapproved and were not presented to the Court, ii. some were 
approved and “not [to] be read to the Court unless particularly desired,” and iii.  “dubious” 
notes or those that had been brought to the Bank by a Governor, Deputy Governor, or 
director of the Bank. Only the third category was read to the Court to determine whether the 
notes were to be discounted or not (C.D. April 12 1764). Then, through the early years of the 
Restriction period, the discount of promissory notes grew dramatically, so in early 1800 a 
Notes Committee was formed to assist the Committee in Waiting in discounting notes. 
 
The Bank of England’s official policy was to favour “legitimate” paper, and as a result a bill or 
note that was deemed accommodation paper when it was brought to the Bank could easily be 
rejected for that reason. On the other hand, the Bank sought in the early years of the 
Suspension to be very supportive of the commercial community, both to help trade recover 
from the recession that preceded the Suspension and because the Bank needed the merchants’ 
support in order to keep Bank Notes in circulation. Thus, by the time the Discount Committee 
is meeting in 1804, it is very clear that the Bank is discounting accommodation paper and that 
promissory notes which now amount to almost 40% of the Bank’s discounts frequently fall 
into this category. Thus, when the Bank chose to support the West India merchants in 1799 
using accommodation paper – that is, a loan that was not based on a commercial transaction – 





A second major shift in the Bank’s lending policy observed in 1799 was that the lending was 
based on a deposit of goods. The basic financing technique used to support the West India 
merchants in 1799 was to use two-month promissory notes that the Bank committed to roll 
over for the duration of the loan. The promissory note was to be made payable directly to the 
party being accommodated, who would endorse the note to the Bank, then security in goods 
needed to be deposited with the West India Merchants Committee, and a certificate attesting 
to the deposit submitted with the note (C.D. Oct 17 1799).35  
 
This was almost certainly the first instance where the Bank lent against a deposit of goods36 in 
lieu of one of the personal guarantees typically demanded by the Bank at the discount 
window. In the course of discussing the legal technicalities over the use of the goods as 
collateral, the West India Merchant Committee proposed that the (promissory) notes be 
secured by government bonds in lieu of goods. The Court of the Bank’s directors agreed to 
this, as long as a certificate attesting to ownership of goods with a value in excess of the loan 
was submitted along with the note and the bonds. It was agreed that the bonds were posted 
as collateral via a transfer of title to the bonds into the names of the Governor, the Deputy 
Governor and another senior Bank director, and that the transfer was accompanied by an 
explicit right to sell the bonds if payment was not made on time. This method of lending is 
what in modern times is called a repurchase agreement (or repo for short), and this was 
almost certainly the first time the Bank made loans using such a method. 
 
It should, however, be remembered that the Bank of England had a long history of making one 
type of collateralised loan: loans to support the issue of government debt. Since many 
purchases of government debt were paid in instalments over the course of a few months, the 
Bank would typically hold the bond on behalf of the purchaser until it was paid in full and the 
bond could be transferred to the purchaser’s name. Based on the structure of the West India 
merchants’ loans, one can infer that the bonds held by the Bank on behalf of the purchasers of 
government debt were likely held in the name of the Governor, Deputy Governor and another 




35 The Bank also offers the more standard option of using a note with “two respectable parties in the quality of 
drawers and acceptors” in addition to the endorsement of the party being accommodated. Given the emphasis on 
collateral in later discussion, there is little reason to believe that this option was much used. 
36 The loans are secured on sugar at £30 per ton and on coffee at £100 per ton. 
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It is clear from the Minutes that the Bank distinguished these two types of loan collateralized 
by government debt, the repo and the purchase-instalment loan. When approving the West 
India merchants’ loans, the Court added: “Resolved that in the opinion of this Court the loan 
of money upon note accompanied with a deposit of stock shall not be drawn into precedent” 
(C.D. Nov 7 1799). Despite these protestations, the precedent of lending on repo was clearly 
set. 
 
The Bank’s support of West India merchants continued for the next two decades. Table 1 
(Appendix I) exhibits the loans made by the Bank spanning the years 1788 to 1822, as drawn 
from the Index entry “Loans” in the Minutes of the Court of Directors. Loans made to the 
East India Company, South Sea Company, and Hudson’s Bay Company are omitted, as are 
loans made to support the issue of long-term government debt (which are classified in the 
Index under the name of the debt issue and not under the name of the borrower). 
 
What is clear from the Table 1 is that in 1803 the Bank had outstanding sizeable loans extended 
for periods of a year or more to a variety of West India merchants. Furthermore, significant 
amounts remained outstanding through 1813. Such lending continued, though more 
sporadically, through at least 1820. Table 1 also shows that in the earliest years of the Bank’s 
extraordinary lending the West India merchants were the only recipients of such long-term 
lending by the bank.37  
 
The loan in June 1801 was made to Hibberts, Fuhr & Purrier. This loan was innovative 
because the Bank reduced the standard “two-name” security that it required on its loans to 
one-name security. In the case of the loans made in 1799, the Bank required both the security 
of government debt as collateral and that bills made payable to the borrowing merchant be 
negotiated by the merchant to the Bank. By this means, each loan had two forms of security in 
addition to the promise of the borrower: (i) the promise of the individual who wrote the bill 
payable to the borrower, and (ii) the government debt posted as collateral. That is, in 1799 the 
borrowers were allowed to replace one of the two names that typically secured a Bank loan 
with government debt posted as collateral. This, however, replaced only one of the names and 
borrowers were still required to provide the security of another payor on the loan. As was 
 
37 Of the four loans to individuals who were not West India Merchants on or before 1803, all are for terms of four 
months or less. The series of short-term loans to Messrs. Goldsmid from May 1802 through February 1804 were to 
a prominent financier of the Government, who was apparently being permitted to finance his purchases of 
Exchequer Bills on instalment. In less than two years the Bank puts a stop to this lending. 
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noted above, these bills that came into existence for the sole purpose of allowing the borrower 
to take a loan out from the Bank were called accommodation bills. 
 
The loan in 1801 permitted Hibberts, Fuhr & Purrier to negotiate accommodation bills, just as 
was done in 1799, but did away with the requirement that the loan be supported with 
government debt collateral, too (C.D. June 25 1801). Thus, in 1801 the Bank was lending for a 
relatively long six-month term against accommodation paper only and required only one name 
in addition to the borrower to secure every pound of the loan. This procedure probably 
reflected a change in the Bank’s general discount policy. By 1804 promissory notes – or one-
name paper – had grown to be almost 40% of the Bank’s discount business. That a significant 
fraction of these notes was accommodation paper was likely obvious to each director. 
Certainly, it was clear after the 1804 discount committee report. Presumably, because the Bank 
had become more comfortable both with accommodation paper and with this lower level of 
security, it was willing to extend these terms to Hibberts, Fuhr & Purrier despite the length of 
the loan the firm sought. 
 
The next loan to a West India merchant was made in 1803 to John Willis & Co. This loan was 
especially noteworthy because the firm had already stopped payment. In fact, the Bank 
rejected the first application of loan in March based on that the firm’s stoppage (C.D. March 
17 1803) but the committee of the Willis & Co’s creditors petitioned in April that they were 
convinced that the firm’s capital well exceeded its obligations and that if the firm could stay in 
operation through 1804 it would overcome its difficulties. The creditors had raised £70,000 in 
outside funds that were committed for the full 18 months of the requested loan and had 
another list of promissory notes that in aggregate amount to £60,000. They stated that if the 
Bank would commit to discount and to renew this £60,000 of notes for the full 18 months, all 
the creditors would be better off than in a forced liquidation. In addition, the creditors would 
forbear pursuing their claims in court for 18 months. None of these creditors were seeking 
any security for their support of the firm, but instead left the firm’s assets to the benefit of 
general creditors (C.D. April 7 1803). 
 
This covenant in favour of the general creditors appears to have been added at the demand of 
the Bank. The Committee of Treasury’s report to the Court recommending rejection of the 




That the House of Messrs. Willis & Co. having actually suspended its 
payments, unless some certain securities consisting of eligible mortgages on 
estates in Jamaica can be conveyed to trustees for the benefit of the officers 
and crew of His Majesty’s Fleet, the captors, and of the neutral claimants in 
appeal whose joint demands appears [sic] to amount to the sum of about four 
hundred thousand pounds currency, they cannot consistently with their duty 
to this house, the public, and the great mass of creditors of the House of 
Messrs. Willis & Co. recommend a compliance with the application (C.D. 
March 17 1803). 
 
This together with the successful proposal indicates that the well-to-do creditors who were 
ready to support Willis & Co. were probably in their initial proposal seeking preferential 
treatment in the form of additional collateral for their support and that the Bank was 
unwilling to be party to such an action. Indeed, the April 7 application states expressly that in 
order to address concerns that have been raised over a “supposed preference” 38 small bills 
would be paid in full along with those that were essential to keep the firm in operation, and 
that the large bill holders would all “subscribe” at least half of what they were owed to keep 
Willis & Co. going. 
 
This loan made to Willis & Co was remarkable for two reasons. First, the Bank was lending to 
a company that was effectively bankrupt. This was probably the first clearly documented case 
of such an action. While it is far from clear what motivated the Bank to intervene in this 
particular bankruptcy, the fact that the firm apparently had significant liabilities to the British 
Navy and that the West Indies formed one of the combat zones in the Napoleonic Wars make 
it possible that a government request lies behind this action.39 Secondly, the Bank was very 
aware of its public responsibilities when engaging in this action and was effectively acting as a 
trustee for the general creditors, demanding that those who were not at the table negotiating 
with the Bank could be sure of getting terms no less than what they would get in a court 
supervised liquidation. This is yet another sign that at the start of the 19th century the Court of 
Directors understood that the Bank had duties to the public that went far beyond those of a 




38 Note that a “preference” is a term of art in bankruptcy referring to a payment made to one creditor that unfairly 
reduces the assets available for distribution to the rest of the creditors. 
39 Note that the second request indicates that it is the British Navy that has a claim on the firm, not just the 
individual officers and crew (C.D. April 7 1803) 
40 Note that the Bank ended up extending the loan once for 12 months (C.D. Oct 25 1804). 
18 
 
Six months later in September 1803, another loan was made to Donaldson and Glenny. The 
amount (£60,000) and the initial term (18 months) were the same as the previous loan to 
Willis & Co., and Donaldson and Glenny was, like Willis & Co, “about to be discontinued”.41 
However, the security for the loan was better because the Bank was requested to discount 
bills, not promissory notes so there were three, rather than two, obligors on every pound of 
the debt (C.D. Sept 28 1803). 
 
This loan was important for three reasons. First, the procedure of applying for this loan 
apparently formed the basis later in 1811 for a standard procedure that was developed for 
requesting extraordinary assistance from the Bank. In particular, Donaldson and Glenny 
requested that three other firms review its books and proffer to the Bank accounts 
attesting to the solvency of the firm. These investigating firms averred that in their 
judgment the loan requested, if granted for the time requested, would be adequate to 
“prevent any probability of disappointment or future embarrassment.” (Of course, they 
also added that if the loan was not made, this would have serious consequences for many 
firms involved in the West India trade.) In addition, the investigating firms each proposed 
to act as securities for a portion of the Bank’s loan. These elements: certification of 
solvency and of the sufficiency of the loan, as well as a requirement that the certifiers have 
“skin in the game” would in 1811 both be criteria for obtaining an extraordinary loan from 
the Bank. 
 
Secondly, after determining that the firm’s long-term assets were worth so much that its 
equity was almost £400,000, the investigating firms proposed that £300,000 in long-term 
securities be set aside “as a cover to such persons as might be disposed to stand forward 
with their credit to assist” Donaldson and Glenny’s. Given that this loan would end up being 
a costly boondoggle for the Bank, one may perhaps be forgiven for wondering whether the 
creditors in this case learned from the experience of Willis & Co’s creditors that setting aside 
collateral for creditors who assisted in keeping the concern going would only be acceptable 
to the Bank if the equity of the borrower exceeded the collateral. Valuation of long-term 
assets being then, as now, more a matter of art than science, it was easy to imagine that a 
 
41 Two more applications for loans from West India merchants were approved by the Court in 1803. Only the 
essential information on these loans is included in the minutes. Simpson & Davison received a loan of £40,000 for 
12 months. Two renewals indicate that it was paid off after 30 months (C.D. Nov 10 1803, Nov 8 1804, Oct 24 
1805). Lushingtons & Mavor obtained a loan of £20,000 for 12 months. Half is paid promptly, but the firm 
struggled for five more years to pay the remaining balance (C.D. Nov 17 1803, Sept 1 1808). 
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motivated creditor might have chosen to take a particularly optimistic view of the future 
value of Donaldson and Glenny’s assets in order to obtain both a loan from the Bank and 
favourable terms for the existing creditors. 
 
Finally, this loan offers a clue as to why the Bank of England was involved in supporting the 
West India merchants. Of the three firms that certified Donaldson and Glenny’s solvency, 
one of the firms was Manning, Anderson & Bosanquet, a West India merchant firm, whose 
partners included a Bank of England director, William Manning, and a Bank Director’s son, 
Charles Bosanquet.42 It is very likely that, not only Manning, Anderson & Bosanquet, but 
also the other two certifying firms were Donaldson and Glenny’s creditors. Presumably the 
self-interested approach of the certifiers taught the Bank a lesson: while half of this loan was 
paid off on time, it took four additional years for the Bank to collect the next quarter of the 
loan, and in October 1808 £15,000 was extended “without engaging for any specific time” 
(C.D. Oct 25 1804, Jan 23 1806, May 7 1807, Oct 20 1808). In 1811, £15,000 of Donaldson 
and Glenny’s debt was still unpaid, and when the rules for making a request for 
extraordinary assistance are set forth, they state explicitly that the parties who certify to the 
solvency of the borrower, not only must act as a security for a portion of the Bank’s loan, 
but also (i) cannot be creditors of the borrower, and (ii) cannot be the Governor, Deputy 
Governor or a director of the Bank. 
 
It has been implied in the recent literature that the Bank of England had a ‘particular bias’ 
amongst its directors towards West India merchants.43 For example, Hall et al. noted that in 
1801, of 26 directors, five were West India merchants and one was a major slave owner in 
Grenada, and that this tendency continued well into the mid and late nineteenth century.44 In 
fact, the presence of West India merchants amongst the Bank directorship was already 
prominent in the late eighteenth century, as demonstrated in Chart 1. It shows that the share of 
West India merchants in the directorship of the Bank of England steadily increased from just 
4% (one director) in 1760 to 30% in 1799.  
 
42 William Manning expanded his father’s West India business to become one of the most eminent West India firms 
in the City. He became M.P. in 1790, became Deputy Governor of the Bank of England during the Bullion 
controversy in 1810 and Governor in 1812. Manning succeeded in venturing into the British territories in the 
Caribbean islands by acting as agent for St. Vincent and Grenada. Checkland (1958), p.464. 
43 Kynaston (2012), p.84.  
44 Hall et al (2014). 
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Chart 1: Share of Bank Directors and Governors classified as a West India Director 
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Note:: The Directors who served from 1760 to 1800 have been identified as having a clear West Indies trading relationship or not having a clear relationship. This means that 
there may be directors who have such a relationship, but have not yet been identified as such. The source is the digitized list from 1694 and 1838 of “Directors Annual Lists” 
available here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/archive/directors-annual-lists/1694-1908-
book1.pdf?la=en&hash=EF0DC0C0263CF81C4FFD93F5A6465B9CD9CA7FCD (Bank of England Archive M5/436). The list of directors from 1760 to 1830 and their years 
of service has been compiled using these lists. By laws of the Bank permitted only 16 of the annual Court of 22 directors to return to the Court the next year (Clapham 1945: I, 
76). As a result, there are distinct patterns in the typical service of a Director. First, anyone who served as Governor almost always served on the Court continuously thereafter 
until retirement. Second, the directors who have not served as Governor typically take every third year off in the early years of their service and every fourth year off as they 
become more experienced. Relying on the Legacies of British Slave-ownership database, the ONDB and the History of Parliament online as well as additional sources listed 
below, the Directors and their relatives with property ownership in the West Indies or a clear mercantile relationship to the West Indies trade can be classified as a West Indies 
Director. The West Indies Directors were then divided into one of six categories:  
• Family has clear connections to the West Indies: the individual or his father, uncle, or brother either has a clear mercantile relationship with the WI or owns property in 
the WI.  
Edward Payne (1756-1794); Richard Neave (1731-1814); Lyonel Lyde (1724 -1791); William Snell (d. 1789); Thomas Boddington (1735-1831); Beeston Long (d. 1820); 
John Whitmore, jun. (1750-1826); Peter Isaac Thellusson (1761-1808); William Manning, jun. (1763-1835); George Dorrien (d. 1835); Nathaniel Bogle French (1758-1816); 
Thomas Amyand (d. 1805); Ebenezer Maitland (?). 
• Clear next generation WI connections: the individual’s son, nephew, or son-in-law either has a clear mercantile relationship with the WI or owns property in the WI 
Samuel Bosanquet (1744-1806); Thomas Raikes (1741-1814). 
• Clear WI connection, but of a brother in law, cousin, or more distant relation 
William Halhed (1722-1786); John Puget (d. 1805); Jeremiah Harman (1763-1844); Charles Pole (1757-1830). 
• WI involvement appears at one remove (e.g. mortgagor, executor) 
John Pearse (1759-1836). 
• Clear connections post-date the year in question (future grandfather or future father in law to WI connected family) Note that for this category only, I have often not 
established, but interpolated the relationship. 
 James Sperling; John Cornwall; William Bowden. 
• No clear connection. Note that there are many names similar to those in the LBS. In the absence of confirmatory evidence, I did not assume a WI relationship. 
The broad measure of WID includes the first four categories. Note that John Whitmore, jun is classified as a belonging to a Clear WID family only because he presented the 
petition from the West Indies merchants for London docks in Parliament in 1796. Otherwise he would be classified as a Clear next generation WID due to his sons’ property 
ownership in the LBS. Additional sources that were used for identifying WID are: 
• Edward Payne: Private Banking in Europe: Rise, Retreat, and Resurgence by Youssef Cassis, Philip L. Cottrell p. 48 
• William Bowden: Strangers Within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire by Bernard Bailyn, Philip D. Morgan p. 425. 
• Lyonel Lyde: http://www.danbyrnes.com.au/blackheath/thebc8.htm  Kellock, `London Merchants', p. 114, and London debt claimants of 1790 appendix, p. 133. 
• William Halhed: 1st Cousin of Richard Halhed: http://aparcelofribbons.co.uk/tag/richard-halhed/  
• William Snell: The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833 by H. V. Bowen, Cambridge University Press, Dec 22, 2005 p. 128 
• Thomas Raikes: pedigree Pedigree of the family of Raikes, formerly of Kingston-upon-Hull (originally of Kelfield and Cawood, near Selby, Yorkshire); by Foster, Joseph, 
1844-1905. 1n https://archive.org/details/pedigreeoffamily00fost/page/n7 
• Peter Isaac Thellusson: Kenneth Cozens, 'Peter Thellusson - Bank of England Director & London Sugar Refiner' available at 
http://www.academia.edu/10873782/Peter_Thellusson_-_Bank_of_England_Director_and_London_Sugar_Refiner 
• John Puget: Horsefield Bank of England as Mentor. HER 1949. 
• George Dorrien: History of Hertfordshire, Volume 3 by John Edwin Cussans, E. P. Publishing, 1881, p. 61 
• Thomas Amyand: miscellanea genealogica et heraldica, 1884, p. 181; Protestant Exiles from France, Chiefly in the Reign of Louis XIV: Or, The Huguenot Refugees and 
Their Descendants in Great Britain and Ireland, Volume 2 by Agnew, David Carnegie A., Turnbull & Spears, 1886, p. 496.
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As Howe argued, the Bank directors, irrespective of their connection with West India trade, 
were themselves exposed to commercial crises and the failure of their own businesses.45 From 
this perspective, it is not surprising that the Bank got involved in supporting the West India 
merchants in financial difficulty. But the Bank also provided ongoing support to the West 
India merchants because it was genuinely committed to prevent the commercial distress from 
threatening the nation’s financial system as it did in 1793. During this period, the West India 
trade was in a fragile state both because it was operating in a war zone, and because of the 
regulation of the slave trade that would eventually culminate in its abolition in 1807. The bitter 
experience of failing to support West India firms during the crisis in 1793 and commercial 
credit during the 1796-97 crisis led the Bank to recognize both a duty by supporting the West 
India trade and the particular danger of failing to do so in the monetary environment created 
by the Suspension of Cash Payment.  
 
Between 1804 and 1807, the Bank of England made three extraordinary loans to domestic 
trading houses; a distiller in 1804 with £18,00046, a London druggist and dry-salter in 1805 with 
£15,00047 and a trading firm in 1806 with £36,000.48 
 
At the end of 1806 and beginning of 1807 we see two loans to West India merchants. In 
October a large loan f £150,000 was made to Thomas Coles & Sons which was paid in 18 
months (C.D. Dec 18 1806, Oct 1 1807). Coles & Co was considered to be one of the first 
rated companies in general brokerage in London specializing in the West India trade. Although 
the firm appears to have recovered from the temporary commercial difficulty of this year, it 
stopped payment in the summer of 1810, which resulted in the bankruptcy of their London 




45 According to Howe, half of 23 Bank directors died with estimated estates less than £100,000 between 1833 and 
1847. Howe (1994). 
46 This firm stopped payment at that time and required the loan in order to pay its excise taxes and keep in 
operation. This loan was apparently paid off according to its original terms. 
47 The Bank agreed to renew the loan a year later, but to no avail: within a week of the renewal approval the firm 
was in liquidation and could not renew the promissory notes. Two years later in 1808, £3000 (or 20%) was still 
outstanding on the loan and the Bank agreed that if half was paid promptly, one quarter may be paid in 1809 and 
the last quarter in 1810 
48 This firm had apparently also stopped payment at that time. Aside from a brief extension for part of the 
total, this loan was paid on time. 
49 The failure of the London bank had direct repercussions on large number of bankers (both in London and 




This was followed by a smaller loan of £30,000 made to Donaldson and Thomas when the 
firm had illiquid bills related to its contract to supply foodstuffs to the “King’s ships”, but this 
loan required extension (C.D. Feb 19 1807, Oct 18 1807). In October 1808, the whole £30,000 
of Donaldson and Thomson’s loan was combined with the remaining balance on the loan to 
Donaldson and Glenny, the related company that we discussed earlier, and was renewed with 
the inauspicious note “without engaging for any specific time” (C.D. Oct 20 1808). By 
December 1810 less than 25% of the October 1808 balance had been received, and the Bank, 
running out of patience, demanded liquidation (C.D. Dec 6 1810, Jan 3 1811). In 1813, 
£25,000 was still outstanding, and the power of attorney issued on July 8 1813 by the Court to 
representatives in Jamaica empowering them to act on the Bank’s behalf in collecting debts 
was almost certainly related to this case (C.D. Jan 28 1813, July 8 1813). Given that these two 
(combined) loans were the only West India merchant loans that clearly resulted, not just in 
delayed payments, but also in losses for the Bank, it is worth recalling that the first loan 
application for Donaldson and Glenny was submitted by Manning, Alexander Bosanquet & 




Chart 2: Extraordinary Loans 1797-1810 (£ thousands) 
 
 




































































































































As Chart 2 demonstrates the extraordinary loans to non-West India individuals and firms were 
relatively small and until 1808 the balances owed by the West India merchants on 
extraordinary loans generally exceeded those to domestic individuals and firms by an order of 
magnitude. From 1807 to 1808 three non-West India merchant loans were made: the largest 
was to Nathaniel Bogle French, a former Director of the Bank, which was paid only very 
slowly over the course of six years; £20,000 was lent to Archibald Dalzel, an African slave 
trader for six months which was extended to just over a year; and £10,000 to C & R Puller, a 
well-connected firm run by the children of a former long-time Bank director who were 
apparently very friendly with the Deputy Governor. This last loan was paid off within a year 
and a half. The following two years of 1808 and 1809 were boom years, and lending to both 
West India merchants and non-West India merchants began to run off. 
 
 
4. The 1811 policy of emergency lending  
The boom years of 1808 and 1809 however reflected the desperate responses of British 
merchants to the disruption of overseas trade during the Napoleonic Wars. The war 
threatened European and American trade, the two most important export markets and the 
leading source of imports for Britain. When the opportunity arose to trade with the traditional 
markets, commercial activity became intense. Also, many merchants sought alternative markets 
especially in Central and South America. As a result of this trade boom in the fourth quarter of 
1809 many British merchants had an overstock of colonial and other imported goods which 
could not be sold. Nevertheless, more imports continued to arrive from Europe and the West 
Indies, as many of them were in fact payments in kind for previous exports. The combination 
of glutted domestic markets and losses by speculative exporters, in particular, to South 
America, led the widespread bankruptcies in 1810. The commercial crisis left the Bank of 
England with both more accounts going into default and a larger quantity of unpaid bills than 
would be the case in the 1825 crisis.50 This is also the first crisis where the minutes of the 
Court of Directors clearly document the Bank’s commitment to support commercial activity51. 
As part of its package of supporting business activity, the Bank did not just act as a classic 
lender of last resort allowing its supply of discounts to increase with the market demand for 
them, but also put in place an emergency lending policy. This policy was built upon the 
 
50 Sissoko (2018) 
51 (Sissoko 2018; C.D. February 15 1810, p. 219) 
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structures that had been developed a few years earlier when making loans to the West India 
merchants.  
 
The Bank of England adopted a new regulation for “all special loans to individuals” in 
February 1811 (C.D. Feb 28 1811, 521-22). Subsequent loans under this category were 
managed by the Committee of Treasury by following these rules, and they generally do not 
appear in the minutes of the Court of Directors unless the established regulation could not be 
applied. The regulation was comprised of four parts: 
 
First, two or more “respectable persons, not Directors of the Bank, nor creditors or debtors to 
the Estate” were required to inspect the drawing up of the applicant’s accounting statements 
to be presented to the Bank, sign them, and “as a confirmation of their belief in the 
correctness of [the statement] agree to become securities for part of the loan.” Second, these 
inspectors must “certify that the sum asked will be sufficient to enable the applicants to settle 
their affairs and satisfy all their creditors” and no loan will be made until “security is given” 
(i.e. guarantors were found) for the whole sum of the loan. 
 
It is worth examining these two parts in detail. The first and second rules resemble the 
procedure taken in the case of the Donaldson and Glenny application in 1803. That is, the 
inspectors (i) presented the applicant’s accounts (or financial details) to the Bank, (ii) certified 
that the loan amount (or sum) should be adequate to enable the firm to recover and (iii) agreed 
to have “skin in the game”. No loan could be made until guarantors were found for the full 
amount of loan. Note, however, that the Bank had learnt from the losses it incurred on the 
Donaldson and Glenny loan, because the Court added one important condition: that the 
inspectors must be neither Directors of the Bank, nor creditors or debtors of the applicant. 
 
The third part of the regulation read, “no loan shall be granted to Houses which have already 
stopped unless upon very special occasion”. This was because the purpose of the Bank’s loan 
was to support the credit of those whose assets were sufficient but “may be for a time placed 
out their reach”, while its aim was “not to enable Houses who have failed to compromise or 
settle with their creditors.” It should be acknowledged that this regulation was stricter than the 
rule with which we are familiar today that a central bank should lend only to illiquid and not to 
insolvent institutions. This regulation, on the contrary, stated that firms needed to seek 
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assistance from the Bank before they had to refuse payment to a creditor, in other words, before 
they met the illiquidity criterion for being forced into bankruptcy. 
 
As detailed above, the Bank of England had the experience of lending to West Indian 
merchants that had already stopped payment in 1803. When the Bank intervened in 1803 to 
support a bankrupt firm, it soon found itself drawn into the back and forth negotiations 
between creditors. The Bank became keenly aware of the impact that its intervention could 
have on the balance of fairness that the legislators attempted to achieve through the legal 
procedures established by the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, as the Donaldson and Glenny 
case revealed, the Bank could be misled by optimistic valuations of illiquid assets into 
permitting collateral to be pledged to certain of the creditors supporting the slow liquidation of 
the firm – at the expense of other creditors including the Bank. That this loan resulted in costly 
losses may well have played a role in the Bank’s aversion to lending to firms that were likely to 
go bankrupt. That is, the Bank sought to avoid becoming the unwitting tool of a subset of 
creditors. The Bank, however, was also aware that it needed to be flexible when it came to 
restricting its extraordinary lending only to borrowers who had not stopped payment. From the 
very beginning the Bank allowed that exceptions could be made “upon very special occasion.” 
 
The fourth regulation stated that, if due to unforeseen circumstances the purpose of the loan 
was frustrated and the applicant was obliged to stop payment and/or declare bankruptcy, “the 
securities [i.e. the guarantors of the loan] are to understand that they will be called on to take 
up their notes, the object of the loan being defeated. And that this resolution be 
communicated to the securities that they may understand this to be the condition of their 
agreement.” Here, the Bank made it clear that, if the applicant of the loan stopped payment 
despite the Bank’s support, the Bank did not expect to be a creditor of the applicant, but that 
the applicant’s stoppage sufficed to accelerate the securities’ guarantees which became 
immediately payable to the Bank. The net result was designed to leave the securities as the 
creditors in bankruptcy of the applicant and to keep the Bank out of the bankruptcy.52 It was 
more likely that this fourth rule, more than any other rules, was most effective in protecting 
the Bank from lending to firms that went bankrupt. As soon as the applicant stopped 
payment, the sureties would be required to pay the whole of the principal of the loan. This 
 
52 Whether this policy was or was not mostly effective in the 1810-11 crisis is unclear. If both the applicant and 
the security declare bankruptcy, then the Bank has a claim in two bankruptcies not just one. There is no question 
that the Bank was still trying to collect on some of this debt in 181?, but whether the problem loans were made 
before the January 1811 policy was put in place remains unclear. 
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gave an incentive to the sureties to make sure that the applicant was in fact both solvent and 
unlikely to stop payment after the loan was made.53 
 
These new regulations were to some extent effective: In 1812, two more loans were made to 
West India merchants (Gordon Murphy & Co and Inglis Ellice & Co.) who had been affected by 
the Napoleonic War, the amounts were for £100,000 and £150,000, respectively, and the terms 
were for 12 to 18 months. These loans were apparently repaid without a renewal. The war also 
affected a South American merchant who received a £40,000 loan in 1814 (Joseph & John 
Corsbie).  This loan was repaid after a single renewal. However, the loan of £100,000 to a West 
India merchant in 1816 (O’Reilly Young & Co.) was less successful as the merchant went 
bankrupt within four months after the loan was made. This event forced the firm’s securities to 




This paper has demonstrated that the first beneficiaries of extraordinary term lending facilities 
designed by the Bank of England were the West India merchants. The Bank was concerned 
about the widespread business failures amongst the troubled firms in the West India trade and 
beyond in the crises in the 1790s. And by 1811, the Bank not only acknowledged its 
responsibilities to act to protect the country’s business and commercial community, but also in 
1811 it adopted as a formal policy active lending to support liquidity constrained firms through 
crises that went beyond the Bank’s traditional passive discount policy. The set of policies for 
the Bank’s active lending included (i) the use of bills that did not originate in a genuine 
commercial transaction as a lending instrument (thereby condoning them), (ii) loans at 
relatively long-term, i,e. for 6 to 18 months, to business firms in need of liquidity, and  (iii) 
loans upon the repo of government bonds.  Only after these lending techniques were 
established in aid of the West India merchants, were they applied to last resort lending during 
the crises of 1810, 1816, and 1825. 
 
In the subsequent decade of the 1820s, the Bank of England made further modifications to 
these lending policies above discussed. Through the early years of the nineteenth century 
 
53 This may not be true if the loan applicant and the securities are so closely connected that the failure of one 
necessarily involves the failure of the other. Then they may join together in “gambling for redemption.” On the 
other hand, the security’s notes were often for less than 10% of the loan so the list of securities typically had 10 
names or more, making this possibility less likely. 
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lending against the collateral of goods, as was noted above, ran into technical legal problems 
that were hard to overcome. In 1826 these issues were addressed by legislation. During the 
early crisis months of 1826, the government refused to provide Exchequer Bills in exchange for 
illiquid assets as it had in the crises 1793 and 1810, and instead moved the effective date of the 
relevant legislation up and pushed the Bank to address the continuing effects of the crisis by 
lending against the security of goods. In the event only £533,000 was lent and only a third of 
the loans issued through this vehicle were actually secured by goods, the rest was on the 
personal security with which the Bank was much more comfortable (February 28, 1826).54 
Further, lending on the repo of government bills and other short-term instruments was 
introduced in 1824 as a means to increase the Bank’s income. A regular policy of lending on 
repo was not established until the end of 1829 when six-week repo was used to smooth the 
cyclical variation of the money. From then on, the use of repo together with the quarterly loans 
during the shutting, became a fixture of the economy for decades. 
 
Historiographically, our paper incorporates two major changes in British economic history of 
this period: that the embryonic development of the last lender lending could be linked with the 
shift in the slave trade and more broadly in the market reorganizations in the Atlantic 
Economy during the Napoleonic Wars. First, the findings of this paper that the policies for last 
resort lending by the Bank of England had been originally established to support the West 
India merchants can lend empirical support to the claim that the slave economy played an 
active role in the development of financial markets in Britain. Economic historians have been 
debating the question of the extent to which gains from overseas trade stimulated Britain’s 
early industrialisation. Over the latter half of the twentieth century, most mainstream 
scholarship on the Industrial Revolution has tended to focus on domestic factors in Britain and 
has paid little attention to the role played by overseas trade in British economic development.55 
More recent scholarship has, however, renewed focus on integrating foreign trade and the 
colonial economy into narratives of domestic economic growth. Pomeranz’s Great Diversion, 
for example, sees the Atlantic markets together with coal, as playing an important role in the 
advance of British productivity from around 1800, over the stagnant growth in the Yangzi delta 
region of China56. Authors such as Acemoglu and his colleagues argue that the Atlantic trade 
 
54 Clapham 1945: II, 108 
55 Thomas and McClosky (1981).  On the summary of the debate over the role of overseas trade on British 
economic development up until 2000, see Morgan (2000). 
56 Pomeranz (2002). 
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might also have fostered progressive political institutions in the eighteenth century.57 Although 
economic historians are in agreement that overseas trade and imperial colonization were 
integral to British economic development through the eighteenth (and early nineteenth?) 
centuries, there is little consensus over to what extent and how precisely the various economic 
factors interacted with each other to stimulate/promote modern economic growth in Britain 
during this period. As for the connection between the slave economy and the development of 
financial markets in Britain, there has been so far only fragmentary evidence to show the actual 
volume of lending made by British banks (country banks, London banks) to the slave trade or 
the West India trade. Our findings from the Bank of England archives add much needed 
evidence to the current literature stressing that overseas trade and imperial colonies were 
integral to British economic development. 
 
In addition, the findings of this paper can contribute to the literature on the historical 
development of the last resort lending by the Bank of England.58 The general consensus is that 
while the Bank of England performed some aspects of the lender of last resort role as early as 
the mid-18th century59, it was only in the 1870s that the Bank fully embraced its public 
responsibilities.60 This paper has demonstrated that the Bank not only acknowledged public 
responsibilities by 1810, but also in 1811 adopted a formal policy of ‘active’ lending to support 
liquidity-constrained firms through a crisis that went beyond the standard ‘passive’ discount 
policy of the Bank. In suggesting these claims, this paper takes a different approach to the role 
played by the British banking system in the country’s early industrialisation from some of the 
recent scholarships. Temin and Voth for example have argued that the British banking system 
was unable to provide support for the economy during these years using data from a West End 
bank, Hoare’s.61 Because Hoare’s focused on providing services to an aristocratic clientele rather 
than to commercial clients, there is reason to believe that its data is not representative of the 
broader banking system.62 In the contrary, by focusing attention on the City bankers who 
provided financial services to the commercial mercantile community throughout this period, this 
paper is able to provide a different perspective to the British banking system. Importantly, by 
moving the date at which the Bank clearly and deliberately assumes the mantle of lender of last 
 
57 Acemoglu et al (2005). 
58 The literature on the historical development of the lender of last resort is surveyed by Bindseil (2019) and Ugolini 
(2017). 
59 King (1972), Lovell (1957), James (2012), Ugolini (2017), Kosmetatos (2019). 
60 Fetter (1956), Goodhart (1988), Arnon (2011), Flandreau and Ugolini (2017). 
61 Temin and Voth (2013). 




resort to the early years of the 19th century, this paper raises the possibility that a connection can 
be drawn between the lender of last resort role played by the Bank and the ‘take-off’ to 
economic growth that Britain experienced.63 This however is a topic for future work. 
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Table and Appendix 1: Loans made by the Bank of England from December 1787 to April 1823.  
 
Note: The table has been compiled from the entries under “Loans” in the Minutes index (as provided for the minutes for each year) and it has 
excluded short-term loans made to support the issue of long-term government debt, and loans to regular borrowers (e.g. East India Company, South 
Sea Company, Hudson’s Bank Company). A borrower was identified as West India Merchant (WIM) when the firm or individual was matched with 
those listed in the Legacies of British Slave-Ownership Database, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/ or noted in the British National 
Archives, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/. 
 
Borrower Type Date Amount  Length Renewals Writeoffs/Notes 
Multiple (WIM 
Committee) 
WIM Oct 17 1799,  
Nov 7 1799  
£1,500,00
0 
6 mo Mar 20 1800 (3 mo) No writeoffs 
Hibberts, Fuhr & 
Purrier  
WIM June 25 1801 100,000 6 mo   
Messrs. Goldsmid Gov’t finance May 6 1802 
Dec 9 1802 
July 7 1803 
Aug 18 1803 











June 3 1802 (£400, 1 mo) 
 
Against Exch. Bills as 
security. In Feb 1804 the 
Court disapproves such 
lending unless upon 
application of Ch. of 
Exchequer. 
Andrew Stirling64  Mar 17 1803 10,000 4 mo   
John Willis & Co.  WIM April 7 1803 60,000 18 mo Oct 25 1804 (12 mo)  
Alderman Boydell  Sept 1 1803 16,000   The absence of term on this 
loan indicates that this “loan” 
may reflect only an unusually 
high credit line for 
conventional discount 
lending. 
Thomas Andrews  Sept 1 1803 60,000   The absence of term on this 
loan indicates that this “loan” 
 
64 Does not show up under “Loans” until fiscal year 1803 to 1804 when the Deputy Governor reports on this loan, although there is an entry under “Stirling” in the previous fiscal 




may reflect only an unusually 
high credit line for 
conventional discount 
lending. 
Donaldson & Glenny  WIM Sept 29 1803 60,000 18 mo Oct 25 1804 (£30, 12 mo) 
Jan 23 1806 (£20, 12 mo) 
May 1807 (12-18 mo) 
Oct 20 1808 (£15 indef) 
Appx £9,000 
Jan 28 1813 
less collections in Jamaica (see 
July 8 1813) 
Simpson & Davison  WIM Nov 10 1803 40,000 12 mo Nov 8 1804 (£20, 12 mo) 
Oct 24 1805 (£10, 6 mo) 
On notes 
Lushingtons & Mavor  WIM Nov 17 1803 20,000 12 mo Sept 18 1804 (£10, 12 mo) 
Oct 10 1805 (£5/£5, 3 
mo/9 mo) 
Feb 6 1805 (£10, 15 mo) 
Aug 7 1806 (£10, 12 mo) 
Aug 20 1807 (£10, 12 mo) 





 Dec 22 1803 






John & Samuel 
Liptrap 
Distillers Feb 23 1804 18,000    
London Dock 
Company 
 Nov 22 1804 





Mar 28 1805 (£50, 4 mo) Note that from March 
through July the debt was 
£100,000 
Lucas, Parkinson & 
Teush 
Druggists Aug 8 1805 15,000  Aug 14 1806 (£15, 12 mo) 
July 14 1808 
(£1.5/0.75/0,75, 2 mo/14 
mo/26 mo)  
Aug 21 1806: subsequent to 
bankruptcy, guarantors 
request for extension denied. 
George Sharp & Sons  Sept 18 1806 36,000  Sept 24 1807 (£15, 4 mo)  
Thomas Coles & Sons  WIM Dec 18 1806 150,000  Oct 1 1807 (£50/50, 2 






WIM Feb 19 1807 30,000  Oct 18 1807 
Oct 20 1808 (indef) 
Appx £16,000 
Jan 28 1813 
less collections in Jamaica 





Feb 26 1807 24,000 6 mo … March 30 1809 (£14, 2 
mo) 
… Sept 12 1811 (£6, 2 mo) 






 April 30 1807 





March 24 1808 (£100, 12 
mo) 
Feb 15 1809 (£50, 12 mo) 
 
Archibald Dalzel  African trader Jan 28 1808 20,000 6 mo Aug 11 1808 (£10/10, 4 
mo/8mo) 
 
C & R Puller  (friend of 
Dep’y Gov’r?) 
Sept 1 1808 





March 2 1809 (£10, 6 mo) 
Sept 21 1809 (£5, 5 mo) 
 
Simon Cock  Feb 22 1810 35,000 12 mo Aug 16 1810 (£35, 6 mo) 
Feb 28 1811 (£35, 6 mo?) 
July 11 1811 (£35, 6 mo) 
March 26 1812 (£31.5, 2 
mo) 
 
Walmsley Turner & 
Co. 
 June 7 1810 60,000  June 6 1811 (£36.7, 6 mo) 
Dec 28 1811 (£23.1, 6 mo) 
 
H. Vos General 
merchant 
June 28 1810 50,000 12 mo   
Goslings & Sons  Wine 
merchants 
July 26 1810 18,000 10 mo   
Richard Wilcox & Co.  Aug 2 1810 22,000 12 mo Feb 20 1812 (£8, ?)  
Aldebert Becher & 
Co. 




March 28 1811 (£46, 6 mo)  
Hunters Rainey & Co.  General 
merchants 
Nov 29 1810 100,000 12 mo April 11 1811 (£90, 2 mo) 
June 6 1811 (?, 2 mo) 
Feb 7 1811: request from 
sureties for extension denied 
37 
 
Aug 22 1811 (£60, for 
sureties?) 
Robinson, Clarkson & 
Co. 
 Jan 3 1811 60,000  July 11 1811 
(£15/15/15/15,  
4 mo/6 mo/8 mo/10 mo) 
 
Richard Debary  Feb 21 1811 3,000  Aug 29 1811 (£1, 4 mo)  
Gordon Murphy & 
Co.  
WIM Aug 27 1812 100,000 12 mo   





 July 29 1813 
Jan 20 1814 
Feb 2 1814 





2 mo, 5% 
2 mo, 5% 
2 mo, 5% 
2 mo, 5% 
Sept 23 1813 (£20, 2 mo) 
 
See note 
On March 24 1814, the Bank 
leases the London Dock 
House and adjoining 
Counting House to the 
London Dock Co for 18 year 
at a rate of £545 per annum. 
This implies that £10,000 of 
the Company’s property was 
transferred to the Bank which 
then leased it back to the 
Company. 





Sept 8 1814 40,000 9 to 12 
mo 
Aug 24 1815 (£20, 6 mo)  
London Dock 
Company 
 Jan 19 1815 
July 13 1815 
50,000 
50,000 
2 mo, 5% 
2 mo, 5% 
March 23 1815 (£50, 2 mo) 
Sept 21 1815 (£20, 2 mo) 
 
Hawks Stanley & Co.  Newcastle 
Ironmongers 
Sept 14 1815 20,000 12 mo   
London Dock 
Company 
 Oct 12 1815 150,000 6 mo, 5% May 23 1816 (£150, 6 mo) 
Oct 24 1816 (£150, 6 mo) 
Jan 9 1817 (£150, 6 mo) 
This loan is on the bonds of 
the Company, the issue of 




Oct 30 1817 (£150, 6 mo)65 
May 21 1818 (£150, 6 mo) 
Nov 19 1818 (£150, 6 mo) 
July 15 1819 (£150, 6 mo) 
Feb 2 1820 (£150, to May 
31) 
June 8 1820 (£150, 6 mo) 
Nov 30 1820 (£150, 6 mo) 
May 31 1821 (£110, 6 mo) 
Feb 4 1822 (£60, to May 
31) 
Fereday Smith & 
Fereday 
Iron & coal 
works 
Oct 18 1815 20,000 12 mo Aug 29 1816 (£20, ?) 
June 19 1817 (£10, 6 mo) 
Dec 18 1817 (£6/2/2, 1 
mo/6 mo/12 mo, for 
surety) 
July 22 1819 paid off. 
New River Co.  (at request of 
Fereday Co.) 
Sept 12 1816 150,000 10 yrs, 
biannual 
payments 
Jan 24 1822 (£?, 5 years to 
April 1832) 
February 1828 £22,528 
written off 
Thomas & Matthew 
Pickford  
Carriers  Mar 28 1816 12,000 6 mo   
O’Reilly Young & Co.  WIM April 4 1816 100,000 12 mo  Aug 8 1816: allow solvent 
securities to renew their notes 
B. Fayle & Co. Clay quarry May 16 1816 25,000 12 mo April 24 1817 (£24, 6 mo, 
for securities) 
Nov 14 1816: securities 
request for extension granted 
Noble & Hunt Newfoundlan
d merchants 
July 11 1816 27,000 12 to 18 
mo 
March 9 1820 (£3.5, 4 mo) Accept country securities as 
security 
Estate of John 
Wilkinson  
Ironworks July 11 1816 62,000 12 to 36 
mo 
July 30 1818 
June 15 1820 
Sept 14 1820 
August 1828: £16,667 written 
off. 
 




Bank carried on at 
Newcastle under the 
firm of Reed, Batsons, 
Reeds & Co. 
 July 25 1816 100,000  May 14 1818 (£20) July 11 1816: first application 
denied. 
Country securities, but not 
mortgages, apparently 
accepted after appeal. 
Campbell Bowden & 
Co.  
WIM Jan 14 1819 150,000 12 mo Dec 2 1819 (£150, 9 mo) 
Oct 12 1820 (£?) 
Oct 11 1821 (£26) 
Oct 3 1822 (£16.3) 
Oct 16 1823 (£7.45) 
 
Edmund Boehm EIM (passive 
for last 20 
years) 
March 4 1819 £130,000   To facilitate dissolution of 
Boehm and Taylor. 
Dissolution is discussed at 
length in Berney v. Davison 
(1820) 4 Moore 126. 
Kent Arbouin & Co.  Mar 11 1819 £20,000   To facilitate liquidation. 
Estate of Boyd 
Benfield & 
Drummond 
 May 10 1821 £150,000   To facilitate an immediate 
dividend to the defunct firm’s 
creditors. Secured by 
Exchequer Bills. 
 
Additional notes:  
A loan to “John Puget” is requested on behalf of the Irish Government and therefore omitted from the Table (Feb 23 1804, 138-40; June 14 1804, 226-28).  
Upon the death of Mr. Goldsmid his estate finds itself obliged to make payment on the Omnium in a market where it cannot be sold. As a result, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
requests a seven-month loan to the Goldsmid estate in order to avoid the dislocation of the market for the Omnium that would be caused by Goldsmid’s forced sale of all its 
holdings. The bank complies with the request (April 11 1811, 10-14). Because the request comes from the Chancellor of the Exchequer this is treated as a government loan.  
In fiscal year 1821 to 1822, there is an entry on loans to clerks who have since retired, regarding a resolution permitting reduction of installment payments in proportion to their 
retirement payments (Dec 13 1821, 213). 
 
 
